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REVERSING COURSE: A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS NEW RULES FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND
CRIMINAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Jay C. Carlisle II*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments by the Court of
Appeals on the doctrine of unjust enrichment and on the
elimination of non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice
actions. Specifically, the article will examine the cases of Georgia
Malone & Co. v. Ralph Rieder1 and Dombrowski v. Bulson.2
In Georgia Malone, a divided Court of Appeals held that a
plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claim could be dismissed as a matter of
law at an early pleading stage.3 The five-judge majority adopted a
heightened pleading requirement, which ignores almost one
hundred years of established precedent4 and relies on unfounded
policy justifications.5
The majority‘s opinion disregards the
equitable concerns involved and creates a mandatory pleading rule
requiring a connection between the plaintiff and the defendant.6
The court‘s new rule is contrary to the remedy of unjust
enrichment.7
* Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding professors at Pace University School of Law. He
is a Commissioner for the New York State Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow
of the American Bar Foundation, and a Referee for the New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct.
1 Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333
(2012).
2 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 971 N.E.2d 338, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208 (2012).
3 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
4 See infra Part II; see also Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 408, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916)
(requiring pleading of essential facts); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §
2.20 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) (―[T]he plaintiff must plead merely that it would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit or that retention of the benefit without
payment therefor [sic] would be unjust.‖ (first alteration in original) (citing and
parenthetically quoting In re Whirlpool Corp., 684 F. Supp. 2d 942, 959 (N.D. Ohio 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
5 See infra Part III.A.
6 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
7 See infra Part III.A.

1211

1211 CARLISLE.EE.MLD

1212

4/10/2013 9:32 AM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 76.2

In Dombrowski, a unanimous Court of Appeals held a client could
not seek damages for loss of liberty and emotional distress in a
criminal legal malpractice action against his attorney.8
The
Dombrowski opinion is based on a faulty analysis and unproven
policy rationales.9 Also, the opinion is not in step with modern
principles of law permitting recovery of non-pecuniary damages in
such actions.10 Finally, a decision to immunize defense counsel from
non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice actions should
be made by the legislature and not by the Court of Appeals.11
The Georgia Malone and Dombrowski decisions demonstrate the
Court of Appeals‘ willingness to dismiss civil claims at the pleading
stage for speculative policy justifications not included in the
evidentiary record.12 These decisions are unfortunate departures
from established case law and frustrate the letter and spirit of the
8 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210
(2012) (―We see no compelling reason to depart from the established rule limiting recovery in
legal malpractice actions to pecuniary damages.‖).
9 See discussion infra Part III.B. Compare Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at
340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11 (―Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal justice system. Most significantly,
such a ruling could have a chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped defense
bar to represent indigent accused.‖), with Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir.
1987) (―Were we to accept the notion that a client‘s recovery on the grim facts of a case such
as this must be limited to purely economic loss, we would be doubly wrong. The negligent
lawyer would receive the benefit of an enormous windfall, and the victimized client would be
left without fair recourse in the face of ghastly wrongdoing.‖), and Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d
474, 480 (Fla. 2003) (―[W]e reject the respondent‘s arguments that permitting the assessment
of damages for psychological injury in the instant case will open Pandora‘s Box to claims for
emotional distress for ‗anyone who spent time in jail justifiably or not.‘‖).
10 See Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (D.N.J. 1989) (―[A]n attorney who
commits malpractice is liable for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his negligence
including emotional distress resulting from the loss of liberty.‖ (quoting Wagenmann, 829
F.2d at 222) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458
(Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989) (―[R]ecovery of damages for emotional distress in a legal malpractice
case—if it is to be limited at all—should turn on the nature of plaintiff‘s interest which is
harmed and not merely on the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct.‖).
11 See Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process:
The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975, 976 (2006) (―The pretextual use of
jurisdiction to restrict remedies has serious implications both within and outside of the tort
reform context. The maneuver exceeds the purpose and intent of the legislative power to
define and organize the judiciary. Such a violation of the spirit of jurisdictional authority
converts the legislature‘s power to define the jurisdiction of the courts into a plenary power to
regulate, or eviscerate, all remedies and legal rights.‖). Cf. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi
Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1633, 1636 (2004) (arguing that judicial denial of an adequate remedy violates due process);
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673,
766 (2001) (arguing that Congress‘s restriction of remedies under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides inadequate redress which dilutes the individual‘s constitutional right).
12 See discussion infra Part IV.
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liberal pleading requirements in the CPLR.13
II. BACKGROUND—UNJUST ENRICHMENT
―The essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment . . . is
whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the
defendant to retain what is sought [by the plaintiffs] to be
recovered.‖14 For almost one hundred years, since its holding in
Miller v. Schloss,15 the Court of Appeals has asked if a benefit has
been ―conferred on the defendant under mistake of fact or law, if the
benefit still remains with the defendant . . . and whether the
defendant‘s conduct was tortious or fraudulent.‖16 The court‘s focus
has been on an equity and good conscience test,17 which, at the
pleading stage, must be afforded a liberal construction with every
favorable inference being given to the plaintiff.18
13 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3026 (McKinney 2013) (―Pleadings shall be liberally construed.
Defects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced.‖); Breytman v.
Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 A.D.3d 703, 703–04, 864 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2008)
(―[T]he court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the
pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine
only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.‖ (citing Leon v.
Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1994); Asgahar v. Tringali Realty,
Inc., 18 A.D.3d 408, 408, 795 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2005) (citations omitted)));
Foley v. D‘Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60, 65, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 1964)
(―[T]he burden [under CPLR section 3026] is expressly placed upon one who attacks a
pleading for deficiencies in its allegations to show that he is prejudiced.‖); David D. Siegel,
Taking Too Much for Granted About Liberalized Pleadings: “Skimpy” Pleading, Even Though
Cause of Action May Exist, Brings Dismissal Too Late to Sue Over, 160 SIEGEL‘S PRAC. REV. 3
(Apr. 2005) (―One of the CPLR‘s major accomplishments is its liberalization of pleadings:
playing down technicalities and looking to the more basic question of whether, handsomely
pleaded or not, the complaint gives notice of the transaction or occurrence out of which the
claim arises, and, from anywhere within its four corners, covers the ‗material elements‘ of the
claim pleaded.‖).
14 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 421, 285 N.E.2d 695, 698, 334
N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (1972).
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must show that: (1) the other party
was enriched, (2) at that party‘s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good
conscience to permit the [other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered.
Corsello v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 77 A.D.3d 344, 370, 908 N.Y.S.2d 57, 78 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Walker, 12 A.D.3d 480, 481, 787
N.Y.S.2d 48, 48 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2008)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
15 Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916).
16 Paramount, 30 N.Y.2d at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (citations
omitted).
17 Id.
18 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 88, 638 N.E.2d at
513, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (―[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a
cause of action, not whether he has stated one.‖ (quoting Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43,
N.Y.2d, 268, 275, 372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977) (internal quotation marks
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The Court of Appeals has long recognized there is a class of cases
―where the law prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons who
have not in reality entered into any contract at all with one
another.‖19 These relationships are constructive contracts based on
the equitable principle that one should not be allowed to enrich
oneself unjustly at the expense of another, so an obligation is
created by law in the absence of an agreement.20
Thus in Bradkin v. Leverton,21 the Court of Appeals reversed the
unjust enrichment dismissals of lower courts.22 Quoting Miller v.
Schloss, Chief Judge Stanley Fuld stated: ―[a] quasi or constructive
contract rests upon the equitable principle that a person shall not
be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.‖23
Chief Judge Fuld concluded that ―[a]lthough there was no
agreement between them, express or implied, the defendant
received a benefit from the plaintiff‘s services under circumstances
which, in justice, preclude him from denying an obligation to pay for
them.‖24
Chief Judge Fuld did not rely on or analyze the
relationship between the parties in terms of a connection or
awareness standard.25
Similarly, in Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State of New
York,26 a divided court, speaking through Chief Judge Charles D.
Breitel, reversed the lower court‘s finding of unjust enrichment
because the defendant had not ―received any benefit, let alone
unjust enrichment.‖27 Chief Judge Breitel did not rely on or analyze
the relations between the parties in terms of a connection or
omitted))); Roni LLC v. Arfa, 18 N.Y.3d 846, 848, 963 N.E.2d 123, 124, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747
(2011) (―[W]e must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true
and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every favorable inference.‖).
19 Schloss, 218 N.Y. at 407–08, 113 N.E. at 339.
20 Id. at 407, 113 N.E. at 339 (―It is an obligation which the law creates, in the absence of
any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others have placed in the
possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such circumstances that in equity
and good conscience he ought not to retain it, and which ex æquo et bono belongs to another.
Duty, and not a promise or agreement or intention of the person sought to be charged, defines
it. It is fictitiously deemed contractual, in order to fit the cause of action to the contractual
remedy.‖).
21 Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1970).
22 Id. at 197, 257 N.E.2d at 645, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
23 Id. (quoting Schloss, 218 N.Y. at 407, 113 N.E. at 339) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 285 N.E.2d 695, 334 N.Y.S.2d
338 (1972).
27 Id. at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
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awareness standard. Instead, he examined the record to determine
if the defendant received a benefit and, if so, whether it was against
equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what
the plaintiff sought to recover.28
In Simonds v. Simonds,29 a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed
the appellate division‘s imposition of a constructive trust on certain
life insurance proceeds when a former spouse had breached a
provision in a separation agreement.30 The court, speaking through
Chief Judge Breitel, defined equitable notions of unjust enrichment
as emerging from the rigidity of early common law and being based
heavily on Roman law.31 Chief Judge Breitel explained, ―[e]quity
arose to soften the impact of legal formalisms; to evolve formalisms
narrowing the broad scope of equity is to defeat its essential
purpose.‖32 He concluded that a constructive trust was necessary:
The conclusion is an application of the general rule that
equity regards as done that which should have been done.
Thus, if an insured, upon lapse or cancellation of insurance,
followed by replacement with new insurance, has a
contractual obligation to designate a particular person as
beneficiary, equity will consider the obligee as a
beneficiary.33
The Court of Appeals made it clear that the unjust enrichment
doctrine does not require the performance of any wrongful act by
the party enriched. The court stated that ―[i]nnocent parties may
frequently be unjustly enriched. What is required, generally, is that
a party hold property ‗under such circumstances that in equity and

28 Id. (―It is difficult to say that the State has received any benefit, let alone unjust
enrichment.‖).
29 Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1978).
30 Id. at 242–43, 380 N.E.2d at 185, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (―The unjust enrichment in this
case is manifest. At a time when decedent was, certainly, anxious to remarry, he entered into
a separation agreement with his wife of 14 years. As part of the agreement, he promised to
maintain $7,000 in life insurance with the first wife as beneficiary. Later he broke his
promise, and died with insurance policies naming only the second wife and daughter as
beneficiaries. They have collected the proceeds, amounting to more than $55,000, while the
first wife has collected nothing. Had the husband kept his promise, the beneficiaries would
have collected $7,000 less in proceeds. To that extent, the beneficiaries have been unjustly
enriched, and the proceeds should be subjected to a constructive trust.‖).
31 Id. at 238–39, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 361–62 (―Born out of the extreme
rigidity of the early common law, equity in its origins drew heavily on Roman law, where
equitable notions had long been accepted.‖ (citations omitted)).
32 Id. at 239, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
33 Id. at 240, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362–63 (internal citations omitted).
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good conscience he ought not to retain it.‘‖34 Chief Judge Breitel
also stressed that courts, in their application of the doctrine of
unjust enrichment, should not look to cases that ―rely heavily on
formalisms and too little on basic equitable principles, long
established in Anglo-American law and in this State.‖35 He
concluded, quoting Chief Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo: ―[t]he
equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief.‖36
III. RECENT DECISIONS
In Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,37 the Court of
Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division and dismissed
plaintiff‘s complaints.38 The Goldman (and Franco) plaintiffs had
brought a putative class action for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment.39 The court noted that ―[l]ike the Goldman and Franco
plaintiffs, Katz argues that the insurance contract was breached
and that the defendant was unjustly enriched‖40 but concluded,
―[h]ere, in each case, there was no unjust enrichment because the
matter is controlled by contract.‖41 Thus, ―[g]iven that the disputed
terms and conditions fall entirely within the insurance contract,
there is no valid claim for unjust enrichment.‖42
In Sperry v. Crompton Corp.,43 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
appellate division‘s dismissal of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment
claim.44 The main issue before the court was whether treble
damages relief was available to a class action plaintiff or barred by
the application of CPLR section 901(b).45 The court, speaking
though Judge Graffeo, held it was not, and then addressed the

34 Id. at 242, 380 N.E.2d at 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (other citations omitted) (quoting
Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916)).
35 Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d at 243, 380 N.E.2d at 195, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (referring to cases
that decided the same issues differently).
36 Id. (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 389, 122 N.E. 378,
381 (1919)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 Goldman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.3d 561, 841 N.E.2d 742, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2005).
38 Id. at 567, 841 N.E.2d at 743, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
39 Id. at 569, 841 N.E.2d at 744, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
40 Id. at 569, 841 N.E.2d at 745, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
41 Id. at 572, 841 N.E.2d at 746, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
42 Id. at 572, 841 N.E.2d at 746–47, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 587–88.
43 Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 204, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760.
44 Id. at 209, 863 N.E.2d at 1013–14, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 761–62.
45 Id. at 210, 863 N.E.2d at 1014, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 762 (rejecting a per se construction that
―the Donnelly Act‘s treble damages provision is not a penalty under CPLR [section] 901(b),‖
as well as the claim that such damages are ―primarily remedial in nature‖).
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secondary issue of whether the plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment class
action claim was properly dismissed by the courts below.46
The Court of Appeals stated, ―[t]he essential inquiry in any action
for unjust enrichment or restitution is whether it is against equity
and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is
sought to be recovered.‖47 The court held ―that a plaintiff need not
be in privity with the defendant to state a claim for unjust
enrichment‖48 but concluded the ―claim does not lie under the
circumstances of this case‖49 because ―the connection between the
[parties] . . . is simply too attenuated to support such a claim.‖ 50
The court did not explain, analyze or elaborate the meaning of ―too
attenuated‖ which suggests the term is dicta, particularly when
immediately followed by a reference to the primary issue before the
court. However, the court did state that ―in this situation it is not
appropriate to substitute unjust enrichment to avoid the statutory
limitations on the cause of action created by the Legislature.‖51
Obviously the court‘s analysis of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment class
action claim was in the context of a class action.52
The Sperry Court‘s unsupported reference to an attenuated
―connection between the purchaser of tires and the producers of
chemicals used in the rubber-making process‖ does not warrant a
general finding that unjust enrichment claims require a pleading to
allege a ―connection‖ between the parties.53 None of the pre-Sperry
opinions, including supporting citations to Aristotle, Pomeroy, Chief
Judges Benjamin Cardozo, Stanley Fuld, and Charles Brietel,
explicitly or implicitly rely on a party ―connection‖ as a prerequisite
to the maintenance of an unjust enrichment action.54 Their focus is
Id. at 215–16, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
Id. at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (alteration in original) (quoting
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 421, 285 N.E.2d 695, 698, 344
N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 Sperry, 8 N.Y.3d at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 216, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 209 n.2, 863 N.E.2d at 1014 n.2, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 762 n.2 (―The lawsuit has not yet
been certified as a class action under CPLR article 9.‖).
53 Id. at 216, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
54 See Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 380 N.E.2d 189, 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359,
362 (1978). The court in Simonds stated:
―Its great underlying principles, which are the constant sources, the never-failing roots,
of its particular rules, are unquestionably principles of right, justice, and morality, so far
as the same can become the elements of a positive human jurisprudence.‖ Law without
principle is not law; law without justice is of limited value. Since adherence to principles
46
47
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on the equity and good conscience rule, which the Sperry court
admits is ―[t]he essential inquiry in any action for unjust
enrichment.‖55
In IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.56 the Court of
Appeals reversed the appellate division and held that plaintiff‘s
unjust enrichment action failed to state a cause of action.57 The
court, speaking though Judge Pigott, relied on its decision several
years earlier in Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., stating
that ―‗[t]he theory of unjust enrichment lies as a quasi-contract
claim.‘ It is an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in
the absence of an actual agreement between the parties
concerned.‖58 The court went on to conclude the plaintiff‘s action for
unjust enrichment arose out of events subject to a written contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant.59 The court explained the
defendant was not required to return the ten million dollar fee to
plaintiff because the ―fee arose from services governed‖ by a
contract between the parties.60 The court also noted that plaintiff
―did not pay the alleged fees.‖61
In Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein,62 a unanimous Court of
Appeals affirmed a divided appellate division‘s decision to uphold
the dismissal of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claim by the supreme
court.63 The dispute arose over the purchase and sale of the
painting ―Paysage aux Trois Arbres‖ by Paul Gauguin.64 Plaintiff

of ―law‖ does not invariably produce justice, equity is necessary.
Id. (other citations omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 67 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1881)) (citing ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 9, at 1019–20 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941)).
55 Sperry, 8 N.Y.3d at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (quoting Paramount,
30 N.Y.2d at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 393).
56 IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 907 N.E.2d 268, 879
N.Y.S.2d 355 (2009).
57 Id. at 138, 879 N.E.2d at 271, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
58 Id. at 142, 907 N.E.2d at 274, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (quoting Goldman v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 5 N.Y.3d 561, 572, 841 N.E.2d 742, 746, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587 (2005)).
59 IDT Corp., 12 N.Y.3d at 142, 907 N.E.2d at 274, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (―It follows that the
unjust enrichment claim cannot form the basis of IDT‘s demand that Morgan Stanley return
the $10,000,000 fee paid in relation to the Net2Phone, Inc. transaction, because that fee arose
from services governed by an engagement letter signed by IDT on July 26, 2000.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 919 N.Y.S.2d
465 (2011).
63 Id. at 183, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
64 Id. at 176, 944 N.E.2d at 1106, 919 N.Y.S. at 467.
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had purchased the painting based on an appraisal from the
defendant who concealed his ownership interest in the painting.65
As a result, plaintiff claimed defendant was unjustly enriched.66
The court, speaking through Judge Jones, adopted the traditional
equity and good conscience test for unjust enrichment cases in New
York.67 The court stated, ―[a] plaintiff must show that (1) the other
party was enriched, (2) at that party‘s expense, and (3) that it is
against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to
retain what is sought to be recovered.‖68 The court then curiously
adopted the ―too attenuated connection‖ dicta language from its
earlier Sperry class action dismissal as a policy justification to
dismiss Mandarin‘s unjust enrichment claim, stating that ―there are
no indicia of an enrichment that was unjust where the pleadings
failed to indicate a relationship between the parties that could have
caused reliance or inducement.‖69 The court considered the absence
of a pleading ―connection‖ between the plaintiff and defendant to be
crucial because, ―[w]ithout sufficient facts, conclusory allegations
that fail to establish that a defendant was unjustly enriched at the
expense of a plaintiff warrant dismissal.‖70 The court reaffirmed
the New York rule that privity is not required for an unjust
enrichment claim but then in a strange twist qualified the no
privity rule by stating: ―a claim will not be supported if the
connection between the parties is too attenuated.‖71
The court did not explain why its new broad pleading specificity
rule was necessary for unjust enrichment actions or how it could
possibly supersede the centuries old equitable doctrine created on
basic principles of good conscience and fairness.72 The court
provided no guidance or precedent as to what constitutes ―too
attenuated [a] connection‖ between parties in an unjust enrichment
adversarial proceeding.73 The court failed to provide any policy
justification for its new formalistic pleading rule other than those

Id. at 176–77, 944 N.E.2d at 1106–07, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 467–68.
Id. at 176, 944 N.E.2d at 1106, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
67 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110, 919 N.Y.S. at 471.
68 Id. (quoting Citibank N.A. v. Walker, 12 A.D.3d 480, 481, 787 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div.
2d Dep‘t 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 Mandarin, 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
70 Id. at 183, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citing Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 8
N.Y.3d 204, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760 (2007)).
72 Mandarin, 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110–11, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 471–72.
73 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
65
66
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that were fact specific to its Mandarin holding.74 Thus the
Mandarin Court‘s qualification of the no privity rule is clearly dicta,
and should not be binding in subsequent decisions.75
A. Georgia Malone
1. Background
Plaintiff Georgia Malone & Co., a real estate and consulting firm,
provided its clients with information regarding the purchase and
sale of properties.76 Defendant Rosewood Realty engaged in the real
estate business.77 Georgia Malone prepared due diligence reports
for a developer (CenterRock) and its managing member, defendant
Ralph Rieder, who agreed to keep them confidential and to pay
Malone a 1.25% commission of the total purchase price for its
brokerage work.78 Based on Malone‘s reports, CenterRock executed
a contract of sale to purchase properties for $70 million, which it
later terminated.79 CenterRock ―refused to pay Malone‘s demand
for its commission in the amount of $875,000 (1.25% of the contract
price).‖80
Malone claimed that it gave the due diligence materials to a third
party for the purpose of selling them to Rosewood, after CenterRock
terminated the deal.81 Malone then alleged that Rosewood used her
materials to generate a commission of $500,000 from a subsequent
sale of real property.82
Malone commenced an action for breach of contract against
CenterRock and Ralph Rieder, and asserted unjust enrichment

Id.
Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 409–10, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (App.
Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2012); see also
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 480–81, 467 N.E.2d 245, 248–49, 478
N.Y.S.2d 597, 600–01 (1984) (citations omitted) (concluding that the existence of an alternate
forum is not a prerequisite to the application of forum non conveniens as such a requirement
had its origin in dicta by the United States Supreme Court and was not binding to future
decisions, although the dictum has persisted as the general rule and has been quoted in
subsequent cases).
76 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 513, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
77 Id. at 514, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 514–15, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
80 Id. at 515, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
81 Id.
82 Id.
74
75
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claims against CenterRock, Rieder, and Rosewood.83 The ―Supreme
Court dismissed all claims except those against CenterRock. On
Malone‘s appeal, the Appellate Division modified, with two Justices
dissenting, by reinstating the unjust enrichment claims against the
Rieders, and otherwise affirmed.‖84
Malone then appealed to the Court of Appeals, seeking
reinstatement of its unjust enrichment claim on the grounds that
Rosewood profited, at Malone‘s expense, by collecting a commission
on the sale of the properties.85 Rosewood argued Malone failed to
state an unjust enrichment claim because it did not allege a
―business relationship or connection between them.‖86 Rosewood
also argued that Malone‘s complaint was inadequate because it did
not assert that Rosewood was aware of the confidentiality of the
Malone due diligence report, or that Rosewood knew that
CenterRock had not paid Malone for producing the due diligence
documents.87 These defenses were based on the Mandarin and
Sperry heightened pleading requirements.88
2. The Court of Appeals‘ Decision
The Court of Appeals majority defined the question as follows:
In this action, a real estate company that prepared due
diligence reports for a developer in connection with the
potential purchase of commercial properties alleges that a
rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired
the materials from the developer and later obtained a
commission on the ultimate sale of the properties. The issue
before us is whether a sufficient relationship existed between
the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust
enrichment cause of action.
Based on the allegations
presented in the complaint, we hold that the relationship
between these two parties was too attenuated.89

Id.
Id. (citing Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 409–10, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494,
498 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333
(2012)).
85 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 515, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
86 Id. at 515–16, 973 N.E.2d at 745–46, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335–36.
87 Id. at 516, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 513, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
83
84
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a. The Majority
The majority based its decision to deny Malone‘s request for
reinstatement of its unjust enrichment claim against Rosewood on
the following factors. First, Malone failed to plead a claim for
unjust enrichment due to a lack of factual allegations in its
complaint that indicated a relationship (business relationship or
connection) between Malone and Rosewood, ―or at least an
awareness by [the defendant] of [the plaintiff‘s] existence.‖90 The
court relied on its earlier, fact-specific, heightened pleading rules in
Sperry v. Crompton Corp. and Mandarin Trading Limited v.
Wildenstein.91 Second, if Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim was
permitted, it ―would impose a burdensome obligation in commercial
transactions.‖92
The majority‘s policy justification for dismissal of Malone‘s unjust
enrichment claim is less than one paragraph and not supported by
the record.93 The majority stated, ―[t]he rule urged by Malone
would require parties to probe the underlying relationships between
the businesses with whom they contract and other entities
tangentially involved but with whom they have no direct
connection.‖94
b. The Dissent
Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Pigott, citing Mandarin Trading
Ltd. v. Wildenstein, stated:
We have established that ―[t]he essential inquiry in any
action for unjust enrichment . . . is whether it is against
equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain
what is sought to be recovered.‖ It is apparent that equity
and good conscience do not permit Rosewood to retain the
benefits of Malone‘s diligent work, and that plaintiff has

90 Id. at 517, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mandarin Trading Ltd., 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 517–18, 973 N.E.2d at 746–47, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336–37
(―Similar to Sperry and Mandarin, the relationship between Malone and Rosewood is too
attenuated because they simply had no dealings with each other.‖).
92 Id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
93 See id.
94 Id.
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adequately pleaded that Rosewood was unjustly enriched.95
The dissent stressed that the plaintiff‘s pleadings showed that
―Malone performed the services and due diligence necessary to
equip a buyer to negotiate and to execute the purchase of the
commercial properties. Rosewood then profited. . . . while Malone
never received compensation for its work.‖96 The dissent explained
that ―it is only fair to allow Malone‘s claim against Rosewood to
proceed at this early stage in the litigation.‖97
The dissent explained that the court‘s precedent on unjust
enrichment never required there be a business relationship or
connection between the parties.98 Citing Chief Judge Fuld,99 the
dissent stated, ―In Bradkin v. Leverton, we found a viable unjust
enrichment claim where there were no direct dealings between
plaintiff and defendant. . . . The defendant in Bradkin knowingly
used plaintiff‘s contacts without paying for them, similar to
Rosewood‘s alleged use of Malone‘s due diligence materials.‖100 The
dissent, citing Simonds v. Simonds, also stated:
This Court‘s precedent on unjust enrichment has never
required that there be a close relationship or dealings
between the parties. . . . ―What is required, generally, is that
a party hold property ‗under such circumstances that in
equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. . . . ‘‖
Nowhere in Simonds did we require defendant to have
procured the unjust benefit or that there be contact between
plaintiff and defendant.101
Also, the dissent distinguished Sperry v. Crompton Corp. and
Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, stating, ―[o]ur holdings in
Sperry and Mandarin Trading never required that there be direct
contact or a close relationship between the parties.‖102
95 Id. (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (other citation omitted) (quoting
Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 182, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110, 919
N.Y.S.2d 465, 471 (2011)).
96 Id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 748–49, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338–39.
97 Id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
98 Id. at 521, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (―Requiring a relationship of mutual
dealing where the plaintiff confers a benefit on the unjustly enriched party treads too close to
requiring privity, which this Court expressly disclaimed in Sperry and Mandarin Trading.‖).
99 Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1970).
100 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 523, 973 N.E.2d at 751, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Lippman,
C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (quoting Simonds v. Simonds, 45
N.Y.2d 233, 242, 380 N.E.2d 189, 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978)).
102 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 521, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S. at 339.
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Finally the dissent rejected the majority‘s policy justifications for
dismissing Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim against Rosewood.103
Chief Judge Lippman explained a ruling in favor of Malone ―would
not impede commercial transactions or create an excessive burden
on contracting parties.‖104 He stated, ―[i]f a business partner
conveys information whose source is clearly the company‘s direct
competitor, the company can inquire about the circumstances of the
transmission of the information.‖105 If Rosewood saw Malone‘s
name on the due diligence materials, an allegation that could be
fully shown during discovery, it is highly likely for Rosewood to
have known the materials were suspect.106 Thus, Chief Judge
Lippman concluded that Malone‘s complaint should not have been
dismissed at the pleading stage.107
3. Critique
It is well established in New York that under CPLR section 3211,
a motion to dismiss should not be granted without first affording
the plaintiffs pleading a liberal construction, and according it the
benefit of every possible favorable inference.108
Unjust enrichment claims are subject to modern pleading rules in
New York, and to CPLR section 104, which requires application of a
just determination standard.109 Malone‘s complaint should not have
103 Id. at 523, 973 N.E.2d at 751, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (―The majority‘s policy concerns are
unfounded.‖).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See Roni LLC. v. Arfa, 18 N.Y.3d 846, 848, 963 N.E.2d 123, 124, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747
(2011) (―On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, however, we must give the complaint a liberal
construction, accept the allegations as true and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every
favorable inference. Indeed, the question of ‗[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its
allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss.‘‖ (quoting EBC I,
Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19, 832 N.E.2d 26, 31, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175
(2005)); see also Jacobs v. Macy‘s E., Inc., 262 A.D.2d 607, 608, 693 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App.
Div. 2d Dep‘t 1999) (―It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed,
accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the
benefit of every possible favorable inference.‖ (citations omitted)); Gruen v. Cnty. of Suffolk,
187 A.D.2d 560, 562, 590 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 1992) (―[T]he sole criterion is
whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations
are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion . .
. will fail.‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275,
372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 104 (McKinney
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been dismissed without giving her at least limited disclosure to
establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact between
the parties. If she failed to do so, her complaint could be dismissed
by a summary judgment.
The majorities adoption of a ―sufficient relationship‖ pleading rule
as a mandatory requirement for maintenance of unjust enrichment
actions in New York is unfounded and contrary to the equity and
good conscience test established by almost one hundred years of
jurisprudence in the Empire State.110 The majorities new pleading
rule is nothing more than a heightened pleading requirement based
on questionable dicta from its Sperry and Mandarin Trading
decisions, and, unfortunately, contravenes pleading requirements
mandated by the CPLR and applicable case law.111
The majority‘s focus on a connection between the parties may be
applicable to unjust enrichment claims based on a ―quantum meruit
theory‖ where it makes sense to require some connection between
the parties that is not ―too attenuated.‖112 However, the majority
fails to recognize that an unjust enrichment claim is broader than a
quantum meruit claim. As Chief Judges Breitel and Fuld explained
there is no need for a ―connection‖ because the equity and good
conscience test asks only if a benefit has been conferred on the
defendant under mistake of fact or law.113 If the benefit remains
with the defendant, the court may determine if the defendant‘s

2013).
110 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.1(2) (2d ed.
1993) (―Unjust enrichment cannot be precisely defined, and for that very reason has potential
for resolving new problems in striking ways.‖); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §
1.3 (1978) (―The great development of constructive trust as a remedy aimed at unjust
enrichment has taken place in this country [the United States], for most of our courts have
freed the remedy of any necessary connection with fiduciary relationship.‖); id. § 1.1 (―Unjust
enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is indefinable. But many of
the meanings of justice are derived from a sense of injustice.‖).
111 See Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 418–19, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494, 505–06
(App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011) (Acosta, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority‘s attempt to
reintroduce a heightened privity requirement for prudential reasons), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511,
973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2012).
112 Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 522 n.2, 973 N.E.2d 743, 750 n.2, 950
N.Y.S.2d 333, 340 n.2 (2012) (―Only plaintiffs pleading a quantum meruit theory of unjust
enrichment are required to show that they performed services for the defendants or at the
defendant‘s behest.‖ (citations omitted)); id. at 516, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
113 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (―What is required, generally, is that
a party hold property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought
not to retain it.‖ (citations omitted) (quoting Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E.
337, 339 (1916)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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conduct has been tortious or fraudulent.114 The fact that a
―relationship‖ must exist between the plaintiff and defendant will
often frustrate the purpose of unjust enrichment actions.115
For example, assume a New York employee embezzles one million
dollars from her employer and gives the money to her uncle in
Buffalo who has no ―relationship‖ or ―connection‖ with the
employer. Under Georgia Malone, the employer might be unable to
maintain an action against the uncle unless he was ―aware‖ the gift
was stolen from the employer.116 If the employer‘s action was
dismissed at an early pleading stage, it would have no opportunity
to develop facts through discovery to support an unjust enrichment
argument.117 Georgia Malone explicitly requires the employer to
plead with specificity and particularity facts that unequivocally
demonstrate what the Court of Appeals defines as a ―substantial
relationship‖ prerequisite.118 The principle goes further. Suppose
Rembrandt (―R‖), removes Paul Gauguins ―Paysage Aux Trois
Arbes‖ from the Metropolitan Museum and sells it to Picasso (―P‖)
for one million dollars (assume the painting is worth fifteen million
dollars and P, who lives in rural Wyoming County, has no
relationship with the Met or reason to believe the painting is worth
more than one million dollars). Assuming P is a purchaser in good
faith, can the Met sue him and recover damages under an unjust
enrichment theory? What would Chief Judges Breitel and Fuld
say? These hypotheticals and other questions, such as privity
concerns, cut against the majority‘s Georgia Malone rule.
114
Schloss, 218 N.Y. at 407–08, 113 N.E. at 339 (―There is a class of cases where the law
prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons who have not in reality entered into any
contract at all with one another, but between whom circumstances have arisen which make it
just that one should have a right, and the other should be subject to a liability . . . .‖ (quoting
People ex rel. Dusenbury v. Speir, 77 N.Y. 144, 150 (1879)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
115 As a result of Georgia Malone, a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing of a
direct relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the defendant was enriched
at the plaintiff‘s expense; and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other
party to retain the benefits. Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 516–17, 973 N.E.2d at 746–47, 950
N.Y.S.2d at 336–37.
116 See id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (dismissing unjust enrichment
claim because it failed to allege that the third-party was aware of the wrongfulness of the
actions perpetrated against the plaintiff).
117 See id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that under CPLR section 3211, motions to dismiss are to be given liberal
constructions and provide the opposing party the benefit of all possible favorable inferences).
118 Id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (majority opinion) (holding that a
sufficient showing of a connection between the parties at the pleading stage is necessary
under a unjust enrichment claim).
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In addition, there are serious concerns about the Georgia
Malone‘s majority policy justification.119 The dissent addresses
them,120 but in addition, it is common knowledge that information
or real estate is available through engineering reports, financial
reports and other documents, but it is necessary for a professional
broker to marshal and analyze the data.121 Doesn‘t a broker, such
as Georgia Malone, deserve to be compensated? The Court of
Appeals‘ majority policy justification has ―set back the rules of real
estate building sales for generations by allowing a competing broker
who purchased stolen due diligence information to profit greatly
while the procuring broker received nothing.‖122
Finally, the majority‘s policy justifications are not supported by
the record because Georgia Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim
against Rosewood was dismissed at an early pleading stage.123 New
York courts never had an opportunity to consider the merits or
whether equity and good conscience entitled Georgia Malone to
recover damages from Rosewood! The final result is unfair and
provides confusing precedent for plaintiffs filing unjust enrichment
claims in New York.

119 Id. (stating that a rule requiring parties to examine both the businesses with whom
they contract and other businesses who are involved, yet have no direct connection with the
specific party, would create a burdensome requirement within commercial transactions).
120 Id. at 523, 973 N.E.2d at 751, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority‘s concerns are unfounded, and that finding for unjust enrichment in the
case at hand would not impeded commercial transactions).
121 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750–51, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340–41 (―Drawing every inference in
favor of plaintiff, Rosewood could not have been a good-faith purchaser because it had notice
from Malone‘s letterhead that the diligence materials did not belong to CenterRock and the
Rieders.‖).
122 See John Caher, Nexus Needed for Unjust Enrichment Is Clarified, N.Y.L.J., June 29,
2012; Glen Banks, Addressing Unjust Enrichment Claim at Pleading Stage, N.Y.L.J., July 23,
2012.
123 Generally, a party responding to a motion under CPLR section 3211(a) or CPLR section
3211(b) may demonstrate that facts may exist that would justify the case proceeding forward
but that those facts cannot be stated at that time, as necessary disclosure has not yet
occurred. See generally David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, C3211:49–51, in N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3211 (McKinney 2013) (observing that CPLR section 3211(d) affords the court
discretion to deny or permit further affidavits or allow discovery prior to dismissal); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3041 (McKinney 2013) (―Any party may require any other party to give a bill of
particulars of such party‘s claim, or a copy of the items of the account alleged in a pleading.‖);
Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 70–71, 790 N.E.2d 1156, 1162, 760
N.Y.S.2d 727, 733 (2003) (―[I]n default proceedings [where] the defendant has failed to appear
and the plaintiff does not have the benefit of discovery, the affidavit or verified complaint need
only allege enough facts to enable a court to determine that a viable cause of action exists.‖
(quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Harold L. Korn & Arthur R. Miller, New York Civil Practice:
CPLR PP 3215:24 (7th ed. 2012) (emphasis added))).
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B. Dombrowski v. Bulson—The New Rule Eliminating Recovery of
Non-Pecuniary Damages in Criminal Legal Malpractice Actions
In Dombrowski v. Bulson, a unanimous Court of Appeals held
that a plaintiff suing his former defense attorney in a criminal legal
malpractice action could not recover non-pecuniary damages for loss
of liberty and emotional distress.124
The court reversed the
appellate division which had found a parallel between actions for
malpractice in criminal claims and claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution.125
The Court of Appeals rejected this
conclusion and relied on unsubstantiated policy reasons to support
its decision.126 The court, speaking through Chief Judge Lippman,
stated:
Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal
justice system. Most significantly, such a ruling could have a
chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped
defense bar to represent indigent accused. Further, it would
put attorneys in the position of having an incentive not to
participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful
convictions.127
The Dombrowski decision is based on faulty analysis and
unproven policy justifications. The opinion is contrary to modern
principles of law encouraging recovery of non-pecuniary damages in
such actions.128 Furthermore, the court‘s policy rational should be
left to the legislature, which is in a better position to determine if
the lawyers should be immune from non-pecuniary damage awards
for criminal malpractice actions.
1. Background
In Wilson v. City of New York,129 a client bought an action against

124 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208,
210–11 (2012).
125 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.E.2d at 210 (―Although the harm suffered by the
claimant is the same—loss of liberty—we reject the argument that these types of actions are
analogous.‖).
126 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.E.2d at 210–11.
127 Id.
128 See infra Part III.B.2.
129 Wilson v. City of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 290, 743 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2002). The
court held that a criminal defendant ―must demonstrate that he would have been either
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his former attorney for legal malpractice in a criminal matter.130
The supreme court denied the attorney‘s motion for summary
judgment, and the appellate division, in an issue of first impression,
reversed,131 relying on Wolkstein v. Morgenstern,132 which held ―[a]
cause of action for legal malpractice does not afford recovery for any
item of damages other than pecuniary loss.‖133 The appellate
division explained that ―pecuniary damages ‗compensate [a] victim
for the economic consequences of the injury, such as medical
expenses [and] lost earnings‘ while . . . nonpecuniary damages [are]
‗those damages awarded to compensate an injured person for the
physical and emotional consequences of the injury.‘‖134
The
appellate division admitted the primary harm caused by the
attorney malpractice is an unwarranted loss of liberty which is
necessarily non-pecuniary in nature but stated, ―[t]his Court‘s
holding in Wolkstein v. Morgenstern . . . amounts to a policy-based
ruling not limited to that context.‖135 The appellate division did not
explain or justify its ―policy-based‖ ruling in Wolkstein, but merely
concluded ―that the non-pecuniary damages must be dismissed is as
applicable in the instant matter as it was in Wolkstein.‖136
In Dombrowski v. Bulson, the plaintiff alleged that his attorney
negligently represented him in a criminal action and that, as a
result, he was convicted after a jury trial of two felonies and a
misdemeanor.137 Plaintiff was sentenced to four years plus a period
of post-release supervision.138 The county court denied plaintiff‘s
motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel and the plaintiff sought and
obtained a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.139 The
federal magistrate determined that plaintiff‘s defense counsel failed
exonerated or released earlier, and therefore not subjected to attack by a fellow inmate, had
[counsel] not represented him in a negligent manner.‖ Id. at 293, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
130 Id. at 291, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
131 Id. at 292–93, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (―[L]imiting victims of legal malpractice to pecuniary
damages, although issued in the context of a claim of legal malpractice in a civil action,
amounts to a policy-based ruling not limited to that context.‖).
132 Wolkstein v. Morgenstern, 275 A.D.2d 635, 743 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2000)
133 Id. at 637, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
134 Wilson, 294 A.D.2d at 292, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (quoting McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d
246, 251, 536 N.E.2d 372, 373, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (1989)).
135 Wilson, 294 A.D.2d at 292–93, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
136 Id. at 293, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
137 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 349, 971 N.E.2d 338, 339, 948 N.E.2d 208, 209
(2012).
138 Id. at 350, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.E.2d at 209.
139 Id. at 349, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
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to conduct an adequate investigation and failed to conduct a
sufficient cross examination of the complainant.140 When the
magistrate issued his ruling, plaintiff had been imprisoned for more
than five years and the prosecution declined to retry him.141 The
indictment was dismissed and plaintiff sued his former attorney for
legal malpractice seeking money damages for his loss of liberty
arising from his wrongful imprisonment and for lost wages.142
The supreme court granted defendant‘s summary judgment
motion holding plaintiff had no right to recover any damages.143
The appellate division affirmed the lower courts order that plaintiff
could not recover pecuniary damages for lost wages since he had
received disability payments while incarcerated but concluded that
the lower court had erred in determining that plaintiff was not
entitled to seek non-pecuniary damages for his loss of liberty and
emotional distress.144
The appellate division stated, ―[i]t is well settled that
nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in a legal malpractice
action involving the negligence of an attorney in a civil matter,‖145
but, citing Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical
Center,146 noted: ―[w]here emotional or other nonpecuniary loss is a
direct result of a defendant‘s breach of duty, a plaintiff may recover
damages for such loss.‖147 The appellate division analogized a cause
of action for criminal legal malpractice to actions for false arrest
and malicious prosecution both of which allow for plaintiffs to
recover damages for loss of liberty resulting from her wrongful
imprisonment.148
The appellate division also noted recent trends in other
jurisdictions allowing recovery of non-pecuniary damages in

Id. at 349–50, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 350, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.E.2d at 209.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 79 A.D.3d 1587, 1589, 915 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (App. Div. 4th
Dep‘t 2010), rev’d, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 971 N.E.2d 338, 948 N.E.2d 208 (2012).
146 Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
147 Dombrowski, 79 A.D.3d at 1589, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
148 Id. at 1589–90, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (―In our view, a cause of action for criminal legal
malpractice is analogous to causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, both of
which allow recovery for the plaintiff‘s loss of liberty resulting from the plaintiff‘s wrongful
incarceration.‖).
140
141
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criminal legal malpractice cases,149 and concluded that a plaintiff
wrongfully convicted due to the malpractice of his attorney in a
criminal case may recover loss of liberty or other losses directly
attributable to his imprisonment.150
2. The Court of Appeals‘ Decision
A unanimous Court of Appeals found the First Department‘s
unexplained first impression policy rationale in Wilson v. City of
New York preferable to the thoughtful and enlightened Dombrowski
opinion by the Fourth Department.151 Chief Judge Lippman stated,
―[w]e see no compelling reason to depart from the established rule
limiting recovery in legal malpractice actions to pecuniary
damages.‖152
The court reversed the appellate division‘s
modification and reinstatement of that portion of the plaintiff‘s
complaint seeking non-pecuniary damages and held, as a matter of
law, that these damages are not permitted in legal malpractice
actions arising out of criminal representation.153
The court
reasoned that criminal attorney malpractice requires the plaintiff to
have ―at least a colorable claim of actual innocence—that the
conviction would not have resulted absent the attorney‘s negligent
representation.‖154
The Court of Appeals rejected the appellate division‘s finding that
there is a parallel between actions for malpractice in criminal
actions and claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.155 The
court observed, ―[f]alse arrest and malicious prosecution are
intentional torts. Malicious prosecution, in particular, requires a
showing that the proceeding was commenced against the claimant
with actual malice.‖156 The court‘s distinction between intentional
149 Id. at 1590, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 221–22
(1st Cir. 1987); Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (N.J. Dist. 1989); Rowell v.
Holt, 850 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 2003); Holliday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 3d 102, 118–119 (1989)).
150 Dombrowski, 79 A.D.3d at 1590, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (―We thus conclude that a plaintiff
who establishes that he or she was wrongfully convicted due to the malpractice of his or her
attorney in a criminal case may recover compensatory damages for the actual injury
sustained, i.e., loss of liberty, and any consequent emotional injuries or other losses directly
attributable to his or her imprisonment.‖).
151 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 351–52, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
152 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
153 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11.
154 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
155 Id. (―Although the harm suffered by the claimant is the same—loss of liberty—we reject
the argument that these types of actions are analogous.‖).
156 Id.
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and negligent torts fails because as the court admits, the plaintiff
must prove by a greater weight of the evidence that he was innocent
of the crimes he was indicted for in the criminal proceeding. 157
Thus, if a plaintiff can meet this burden of proof and also show that
the legal malpractice caused a loss of liberty, the damages available
for the tort of false imprisonment is actionable regardless of
malice.158 The fact that an actual malice showing is available for a
malicious prosecution action is not determinative because an
innocent person falsely imprisoned is equally damaged in respect to
compensatory damages, regardless of whether the imprisonment
flows from intentional conduct by the defendant.159
The crux of the Court of Appeals decision in Dombrowski rests on
policy issues that are not supported by the record. The Court
stated:
Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal
justice system. Most significantly, such a ruling could have a

157 See Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 566 (Or. 1993) (―We hold that, in order for one
convicted of a criminal offense to bring an action for professional negligence against that
person‘s criminal defense counsel, the person must . . . allege ‗harm‘ in that the person has
been exonerated of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, through postconviction relief proceedings, or otherwise.‖); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein &
Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 1000 (N.H. 1999) (―[T]actical or strategic decisions made by
defense counsel during their representation should not be subject to attack by clients unable
to prove their actual innocence.‖).
158 See, e.g., Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 36 (1961) (―It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may seek redress for
every substantial wrong.‖); Ehrgott v. Mayor of N.Y., 96 N.Y. 264, 281 (1884) (―The best
statement of the rule is that a wrong-doer is responsible for the natural and proximate
consequences of his misconduct; and what are such consequences must generally be left for
the determination of the jury.‖); D. Dusty Rhoades & Laura W. Morgan, Recovery for
Emotional Distress Damages in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 45 S.C. L. REV. 837, 845 (1993)
(―When an attorney‘s negligence causes a client‘s loss of liberty, courts have been willing to
step away from the general rule barring damages for emotional distress. Generally, these
cases hold that when an attorney represents a criminal defendant, incarceration is the
foreseeable result of negligence. Accordingly, damages for the mental anguish arising from
that foreseeable result, a non-pecuniary damage, should not be barred.‖).
159 Velie v. Ellis Law, P.C., 48 A.D.3d 674, 675, 854 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t
2008) (―To establish a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant attorney failed to exercise ‗the ordinary reasonable skill and
knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal community, and that the attorney‘s
breach of [that] duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable
damages.‘‖ (quoting Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 442,
867 N.E.2d 385, 387, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (2007))); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 917
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (―[An attorney is liable for] that which his negligence was a
substantial factor in bringing about. His negligence need not be the proximate cause of such
damages. It suffices if it is a proximate cause thereof.‖).
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chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped
defense bar to represent indigent accused. Further, it would
put attorneys in the position of having an incentive not to
participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful
convictions.160
The court‘s policy concerns are best left to the legislature, which
is in a better position to decide if court appointed or public defender
attorneys should be immunized from non-pecuniary damages in
criminal legal malpractice actions. Obviously, the court‘s ban on
non-pecuniary damages will prevent additional financial burdens on
the public purse in New York, but this concern should be resolved
by the legislature. Similarly, the court‘s ban may have a potential
affect on the cost and availability of malpractice insurance for the
private bar, but the Dombrowski record is silent on this issue.161
The court‘s reference to ―devastating consequences for the
criminal justice system‖ in New York is mistaken and not supported
by evidence in the record.162 Lacking evidence on this issue, the
court should not conclude that the inclusion of non-pecuniary
damages in a criminal legal malpractice cases would affect the
quality of legal representation for criminal defendants in New
York.163 The court‘s conclusions are speculative and contrary to the
idea that one may seek redress for every substantiated wrong.
The court‘s policy focus should have been on the ―nature of [the]
plaintiff‘s interest which is harmed,‖164 and not on whether
inclusion of non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice
actions will have a ―chilling effect‖ on defense lawyers.165 Again, the

160 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208,
210–11 (2012).
161 Id. (focusing only on the effects of attorneys‘ willingness to participate rather than
broader financial concerns the ruling may have).
162 Id.; see also Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37
(―Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it
is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction.‖); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker &
Co., 73 A. 688, 692 (Md. 1909) (―The argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself
to a court of justice resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy in all cases
because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one.‖).
163 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11 (―[A
contrary holding] could have a chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped
defense bar to represent indigent accused. . . .[and] put attorneys in the position of having
an incentive not to participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful convictions.‖).
164 Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989).
165 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11; see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (―[A]ctor‘s negligent conduct is a legal cause of
harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b)
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conclusion is not supported in the record. To the contrary, one can
reasonably conclude that criminal defense lawyers will have
enhanced incentives to vigorously represent their clients if they
understand non-pecuniary damages can be awarded for their
negligent representation of criminal defendants.
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not discuss or analyze recent
trends in other states in favor of allowing recovery for loss of liberty
in criminal legal malpractice cases.166 Courts in Massachusetts,
New Jersey, California, and Florida have stepped away from the
general rule barring damages for emotional distress in criminal
legal malpractice cases.167 They recognize that wrongful convictions
caused by a lawyer‘s criminal negligence can lead to lengthy
incarceration and loss of liberty, which may constitute the only
grounds for a meaningful damage recovery in a criminal
malpractice action.
For example, in Lawson v. Nugent, the District Court of New
Jersey held that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover damages for
emotional distress as a result of counsel‘s failure to mitigate or
investigate substantial sentencing enhancements.168 As a result of
counsel‘s woes, the claimant sought damages for ―emotional anguish
he sustained during the ‗extra‘ twenty months of confinement [he
served] in a maximum security penitentiary.‖169 Recognizing that
―mental and emotional distress is just as ‗real‘ as physical pain, and
that its valuation is no more difficult,‖ the court directed that
damages for emotional distress should be recoverable.170 The court

there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his
negligence has resulted in the harm.‖).
166 See David A. Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts: Recent Developments, 78
MASS. L. REV. 74, 82 (1993).
167 See, e.g., Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1991) (holding that a client
could maintain a legal malpractice action seeking damages for emotional distress based on
the allegations that the attorney failed to pursue the client‘s claims for post-conviction relief);
Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 95 (D. N.J. 1988) (concluding that damages are
recoverable when an attorney‘s negligence in representing the client in a criminal case caused
the client to serve more time in prison than necessary); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112,
118 (Kan. 1984) (holding that damages for emotional distress may be recovered in criminal
malpractice cases).
168 Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 92 (―Plaintiff alleges that defendant permitted and
recommended the guilty plea without inquiring whether any factual basis existed for the plea,
particularly with regard to the use of weapons.‖).
169 Id. Four years after sentencing, other legal counsel successfully obtained a reduction of
the defendant‘s sentence. Id. The court vacated the defendant‘s guilty plea as to the two
aggravated counts of the indictment. Id.
170 Id. at 95 (citing Berman v. Allen, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979)).
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directed that ―‗medical evidence establishing substantial bodily
injury or severe and demonstrable psychiatric injury proximately
caused by the tortfeasor‘s conduct‘‖ could be demonstrated without
undue burden or frustrating public policy concerns.171
Similarly, in Singleton v. Stegall,172 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a legal malpractice action, seeking damages
for emotional distress, was viable when damages are proven to be
―separable from that proximately flowing from [the client‘s]
encounter with the legal process.‖173 The court reasoned that a
client may show that counsel‘s defaults were the proximate cause of
substantial emotional distress that may be, at times, differentiated
from that attendant upon a legal plight.174 The court noted that ―a
citizen‘s encounter with the legal process is a source of great
anxiety. The average litigant experiences substantial emotional
distress from ‗the rigors of an action, with all of its traumatic
impact.‘‖175 Nevertheless, the court directed that recovery may be
appropriate in certain cases where counsel‘s woes have caused the
tortious infliction of emotional distress irregular to the legal
process.176
In Wagenmann v. Adams, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit also concluded that a client could recover damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a malpractice action.177
While recognizing that non-pecuniary damages are generally
disallowed in most malpractice cases, the court reasoned that
situations when the lawyer‘s malpractice results in a loss of liberty
are inherently different.178 Focusing on the nature of the harm, the
court reasoned that ―[a]ny attorney . . . should readily . . .
anticipate[] the agonies attendant upon involuntary (and
inappropriate) commitment . . . and the subsequent stigma and fear

171 Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 95 (citing Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1349 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)).
172 Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1242 (Miss. 1991) (remanding malpractice action
to determine whether a prisoner could recover damages for emotional distress as a result of
counsel‘s failure to prepare, file, and present a petition for post-conviction relief, allowing the
statute of limitations to run).
173 Id. at 1247.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 221–22 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that emotionallybased injuries were proper in malpractice action when counsels‘ neglect contributed to the
defendant‘s confinement).
178 Id. at 222.
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associated with such a traumatic episode.‖179 Thus, the court
concluded that when counsel ―caused his client a substantial loss of
liberty and exposed him to a consequent parade of horrible, . . .
[there is] no reason artificially to shield . . . his carelessness.‖180 The
court also observed that to disallow such recovery would not be in
the interest of justice, concluding that ―[t]he indignities to which the
plaintiff was subjected through the callous neglect of one appointed
to champion his cause translate into a substantial monetary
entitlement.‖181
IV. CONCLUSION
The Georgia Malone and Dombrowski discussions are primarily
based on broad and sweeping policy generalizations, which are
unsubstantiated and not supported by the record. The Court of
Appeals‘ policy pronouncements are brief and conclusory. They are
not the product of a careful and thoughtful analysis, which the
bench and bar of New York expect and deserve from the Empire
State‘s highest court.
The tort of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy developed
by former Chief Judges Benjamin Cardozo, Stanley Fuld, and
Charles Breitel, who relied on Aristotle and Pomeroy to develop an
equity and good conscience test to do, ―that which should have been
done‖182 and ―to soften the impact of legal formalisms.‖183 Their test
was not intended to be augmented by a mandatory unprecedented
heightened pleading requirement propounded by the Georgia
Malone Court of Appeals. If New York courts determine the century
old traditional requirements of unjust enrichment exist, they should

Id.
Id.
181 Id. (―We are not required by the law of the commonwealth, as we read it, to reach such
an unjust result.‖).
182 Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 380 N.E.2d 189, 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362
(1978). See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380,
(1919) (―[C]onstructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a
trustee.‖); Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 27, 85 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1949) (―[I]ts
applicability is limited only by the inventiveness of men who find new ways to enrich
themselves unjustly by grasping what should not belong to them.‖).
183 Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d at 239, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362; see BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 39 (Andrew L. Kaufman ed., Quid Pro Law
Books 2010) (―[W]hen the demon of formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific
order,‖ a judge needs to be reminded that ―[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society.‖).
179
180
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not be prohibited from fashioning enforcement relief by hypertechnical pleading rules created sua sponte by the Georgia Malone
Court of Appeals.
The tort of criminal legal malpractice provides a remedy of
damages for a defense counsel‘s negligence which results in a
wrongful conviction and wrongful incarceration.184 The remedy is a
meaningless one without a measure of recovery, which the
Dombrowski Court of Appeals denies as a matter of law.185 The loss
of liberty and emotional distress damages are extremely difficult to
prove, but a deserving plaintiff should be given the opportunity to
do so. The criminal defense bar of New York, most of whom are
court appointed or public defenders, will not lose interest or
incentives in representing defendants because non-pecuniary
damages may be awarded against them in criminal legal
malpractice actions. The arduous requirement that a plaintiff
proves ―a colorable claim of actual innocence‖186 and ―that [his]
conviction would not have resulted absent [his] attorney‘s negligent
representation‖187 will screen out most claims before the issue of
non-pecuniary damages arise. Finally, the legislature, and not the
Court of Appeals, should decide whether criminal defense attorneys
should be immunized from non-pecuniary damage awards.

184 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 350, 971 N.E.2d 338, 339, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209
(2012).
185 Id. at 350, 352, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 341, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 209, 211.
186 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
187 Id.

